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American Antitrust and
Foreign Operations:
What Is Covered?
JAMES A. RAHL*
My remarks will be addressed to the question-What foreign opera-
tions of American firms are reached by American antitrust law? To
what does it apply?
Some firms answer this question by simply telling their executives
and sales personnel operating abroad to assume that American anti-
trust rules are always applicable. This approach comes from uncer-
tainty as to what the actual territorial scope of American law is; from
concern that evidence of what the firm does abroad, even if lawful
there under both American and foreign law, might be used as evidence
of illegal activities at home; and from a belief that, since American law
is generally stricter than foreign laws, compliance with its rules will
bring automatic compliance with foreign law as well.
There are a small number of instances in which foreign antitrust
rules are stricter than American law. For example, the French antitrust
* Dean of theNorthwestern University Law School. This address was delivered before
the Corporate Counsel Institute on October 3, 1973.
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law prohibits some refusals to sell which would be lawful under our
law. By and large, however, this is not a bad rule of thumb for practical
management purposes, although it has given foreigners an exagger-
ated idea about the real extraterritorial scope of American law and has
thus increased our diplomatic problems.
This approach could end my speech right now. But some of you
prefer a more sophisticated system, as you are certainly entitled to do,
so I will go on. The real scope of American law, while very broad, is by
no means unlimited, and following it everywhere is certainly not
required. It does not attach with citizenship and run wherever an
American happens to go. Congress probably could pass such an anti-'
trust law, but it has not done so.
In the remaining discussion, I will refer first to recent Government
policy statements on this subject. Second, I will discuss the "commerce"
scope of American law. Third, I will refer to the effect on our law of
foreign government activity and to international law principles; and
finally, I will mention the impact of all of this upon certain key types of
transactions. Time does not permit much discussion of procedural
questions, of the Webb-Pomerene Act, or of foreign antitrust laws.
I
RECENT GOVERNMENT POLICY STATEMENTS
In the past two years, there have been several statements of policy on
these questions by Antitrust Division officials. The most important was
that by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Comegys in January, 1972,
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the
Senate Commerce Committee.' It was made when that Subcommittee
was considering proposed legislation (which did not pass) which would
greatly have expanded the exemptions for restraints of competition in
exports now found in the Webb-Pomerene Act and would have substi-
tuted a wholly new enforcement system, with the Department of Justice
reduced to a minor role. Much less sweeping legislation is currently
before Congress. 2
Attached to the testimony by Mr. Comegys is a Memorandum of the
Department outlining 12 hypothetical examples of how American
1. Hearings on S. 2754, the "Export Expansion Act of 1971" before the Subcomm. on the Study
of Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at
807-12 (1972), partially reprinted in 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 50,129, at 55,207 (1974).
2. S. 1483-1488, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973).
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antitrust laws have been alleged to injure U.S. exports.3 The examples
deal with patents and know-how, distribution, joint ventures, and
compliance with foreign laws. These are followed by brief comments by
the Department designed to clarify the law applicable to them. In a
number of cases, the Memorandum undertakes to demonstrate that
American law would not apply as broadly as might be thought, and
would not be as injurious as supposed.
In three published speeches cited in my outline, by Messrs. Kauper,
Baker and Clearwaters, the present top administration of the Antitrust
Division has reaffirmed the Comegys statement and the Memorandum,
together with some additional commentary. 4
Anyone with a problem in this area should of course study these
statements. Although they involve what someone recently called "law-
making by luncheon speech," they will probably not spoil your lunch.
They are commendable efforts to clarify an area in which heretofore
we have had to do an inordinate amount of guessing. If your kind of
problem is dealt with, you may gain a greater feeling of certainty; you
will often be surprisingly comforted; and if not, at least you will be
forewarned.
But a word of caution is also in order. These statements are better
guides to enforcement policy than they are to the law itself. The Justice
Department cannot make law at luncheons, or by testimony in Con-
gress. It not only cannot bind its successors, but it cannot control the
actions of the Federal Trade Commission, nor of the courts in private
suits, nor indeed of the courts in its own suits. Moreover, the state-
ments are accompanied by very little case citation, analysis and exposi-
tion of underlying legal theory. Some decisive issues lie beneath the
surface and are not explicitly recognized, or are treated only summar-
ily.
It is especially important to remember that private suits and antitrust
and patent misuse defenses continue to grow in significance without
regard to Government enforcement policies. The Consumers Union case
3. Reprinted in 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 50,129, at 55,208 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum].
4. Address by Thomas E. Kauper, Asst. Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before
the New York State Bar Ass'n., New York City, Jan. 24, 1973, reprinted in'5 CCH TRADE
REG. REP. 50,160, at 55,280 (1974); Address by Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy
Planning, Antitrust Division, before the New York State Bar Ass'n., New York City, Jan.
24, 1973, reprinted in 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 50,161, at 55,284 (1974); Address by
Keith I. Clearwaters, Special Asst. to the Asst. Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
before the Ass'n. of General Counsel, Hot Springs, Virginia, May 4, 1973, reprinted in 5
CCH TRADE REG. RE'. 50,169, at 55,300 (1974).
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is a striking example of the independence displayed in such
proceedings.5 Now pending on appeal before the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, the case has included an antitrust claim
against the Secretary of State and some U.S. and foreign steel com-
panies arising out of the so-called "voluntary" restraints upon exports
of steel to the U.S., agreed to by foreign companies at the urging of the
State Department. The Justice Department is in the uncomfortable
position of defending the case. Neither the plaintiff nor the District
Court Judge, Judge Gesell, were swayed by the Government's asser-
tions that the law permits the Presfdent to authorize such restraints,
nor, I must confess, am I.
An overall theme runs through the recent Justice Department state-
ments which throws considerable light on enforcement policy. This
theme is that the Antitrust Division is concerned largely only with two
broad types of restraint of competition in foreign commerce:
(1) the first are restraints which deprive the domestic economy of the
benefits of competition from imports, or entry of foreign firms into
production in the United States; and (2) the second are restraints which
seriously bar or restrict exports by American firms. 6
These two categories will indeed cover most of the cases which have
been brought. Undoubtedly, they should be the primary concern of
policy-makers. But they do not cover all of the cases. And the theoreti-
cal reach of the statutes, particularly the Sherman Act, is broader.
This apparent attempt by the Justice Department to narrow the
focus of the antitrust laws in foreign commerce should not have been
necessary to establish that antitrust is not damaging to this nation's
foreign trade. While I know full well that the problems of individual
firms are sometimes greatly complicated by American antitrust rules
and that plans sometimes have to be changed or even cancelled, it does
not follow that, overall, our firms have been rendered less able to
compete at home or abroad, or that either our balance of trade or our
balance of payments have been hurt on this account. There is every
reason to believe that, on the contrary, our rules of competition have
kept American firms out of countless arrangements abroad which
would have limited their expansion and that the spur of competition
5. Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). [As this issue went
to press, the decision in Consumers Union v. Rogers was reversed sub nom., Consumers
Union v. Kissinger,--F.2d-(D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 1974)-Ed.]
6. See 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 50,161, at 55,283 (1974) (Statement by Donald I.
Baker noting the Division's concern with these types of restraints).
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has greatly benefited the growth of American business, the outflow of
exports, and the inflow of dividends and other payments. The Justice
Department, it seems to me, should develop this kind of evidence and
bring it to public attention, and not limit itself to defensive maneuvers
and possible retrenchments in the law.
In the following discussion of the substantive scope or "subject-
matter jurisdiction" of the statutes, I will illustrate a few of the differ-
ences between the broad reach of the laws, insofar as cases and theory
go, and the narrower approach of recent Justice Department state-
ments, although that is not my only purpose in this discussion.
II
SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE, OR "SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION"
The language of the Sherman Act, applying to restraints or
monopolizing conduct where "commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations," is involved, supplies a very broad base for the
substantive 'reach of the statute. This subject-matter scope of the
Sherman Act should not be, but often is, confused with problems of
so-called "personal jurisdiction," involved in obtaining service of pro-
cess and venue. Where foreign firms are concerned, the subject-matter
scope of the Act often greatly exceeds the ability of courts to obtain
personal jurisdiction. There is seldom any question about the ability to
obtain such jurisdiction over American firms, however, or over their
foreign branches and subsidiaries, although assertions of personal
jurisdiction over them abroad occasionally cause conflict with foreign
nations.
The Sherman Act, unlike sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, applies
to prohibited conduct involving all kinds of "commerce," defined by
the Attorney General's Committee to include "the entire range of
economic activity."7 To invoke the Act, a relation to either interstate or
foreign commerce will suffice. "Foreign" commerce normally refers to
U.S. exports or imports. But the concept may reach transactions whose
impact is entirely outside the United States, if the court thinks that U.S.
interests are heavily involved. In the Pacific Seafarers case,' the Act was
7. REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 77-80 (1955).
8. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.D.C. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); See also ABA ANTrrRusT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at
55 (1968).
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held applicable to restraints used solely in shipping between foreign
ports, where the shipments were financed by the U.S. Government and
were limited by law to transportation in U.S. ships.
The greai majority of decided cases have involved international
market-sharing arrangements which excluded competition from the
United States and thus affected interstate commerce.' No foreign
commerce clause is needed to reach such cases. The clause is impor-
tant, however, in reaching cases in three remaining categories
-interference with foreign commerce, such as through boycotting or
exclusive agreements in export trade; 10 restraint of competition in the
course of foreign commerce, such as through price-fixing;" and re-
straints in foreign markets, to which the Act seldom applies, but which
can be reached sometimes, as in the Sanib case,12 where a refusal to sell
abroad affected the ability of the buyer to export to the United States.
It has often been said that the restraint must "directly and substan-
tially affect" commerce.' 3 My research indicates, however, that this
language overstates what the cases have generally required. It is more
accurate to say that the restraint must either occur "in" the course of
interstate or foreign commerce, or if it is not in it, then it must
"substantially affect" commerce.' 4 The question dealt with by the test is
9. J.-RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST: OVERLAP & CONFLICT 67
(1970).
10. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)
(The Court found sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of whether there had
been a section I Sherman Act conspiracy between Union Carbide and its Canadian
subsidiary to prevent plaintiffs exports from the United States.); Pacific Coast Agricul-
tural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade Cas.) 1
74,523 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (exclusive selling agreement between Sunkist and a Hong Kong
distributor held to restrain American export trade in the export of oranges); United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) (a combination
of American firms having joint ventures abroad which restricted the firms' exports from
the United States was found to violate section I of the Sherman Act).
11. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199 (1968)
(price fixing and allocation of sales by a combination of U.S. firms was held not to be
exempt from U.S. antitrust laws despite the Webb-Pomerene Act exemption; the sales
under scrutiny were made to foreign purchasers under U.S. foreign aid programs);
United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603 (D. Hawaii 1963) (a combination of steel
scrap exporters to fix prices in export sales was found to violate the Sherman Act). But see
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD 105 (1958); W. FUGATE,
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWs 102-104 (1958).
12. Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (After the
defendant had entered into the banana dehydrating business in Honduras, it stopped its
sales of bananas to Sanib, a banana dehydrating competitor in the market. This allegedly
resulted in the inability of the plaintiff to export to the U.S. and was held to state a cause
of action.).
13. See Rahl, supra note 9, at 61 n.25.
14. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-103
(C.D. Cal. 1971), affd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972). See also Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1970); Rahl, supra note 9, at 59-67.
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not whether the law is violated, but only whether the law applies. There
is little question that the law can apply to any restraint, however small,
which takes place in the course of commerce. On the other hand, if the
restraint occurs before, or after the interstate or foreign commerce
phase, or is somehow tangential to it, it becomes important to decide
whether there is an effect on commerce. In such cases, Congress simply
has not regulated the conduct unless it affects commerce substantially.
For example, if competing American exporters agree upon selling
prices, the restraint of competition is in export trade, and the Act will
apply without regard to whether the prices charged have any abnormal
effect on sales. None need be shown. But if an American firm produc-
ing abroad enters into a price-fixing agreement with competitors as to
sales abroad of its foreign-produced goods, the Act will not apply,
unless it can be shown that the price fixing would-at least in theory
-have a substantial impact on American exports or imports. This is
rare, but it might be possible if the prices were so high as to discourage
a flow of raw materials from the United States, or by analogy to the
Sanib case, if foreign buyers who would ordinarily resell to the United
States could not do so because of the high prices.
There is great confusion over -whether the restraint must in some
way adversely affect the commerce involved. The common, if not
prevalent, impression is that it must-that the volume must be di-
minished, or the flow distorted. But this popular view, however widely
held, does not, in my view, withstand analysis. It is obviously inapposite
as to restraints occurring "in" commerce, where no effect at all need be
shown. Most foreign commerce cases are of this type.1 5 Even where
effect is necessary to support subject-matter jurisdiction, the effect
need not be adverse, although it usually is. The adverse effect which
the Act requires is adverse effect on competition, not adverse effect on
the volume of commerce. I think that people are often erroneously led
to take literally the statutory phrase, "restraint of trade or commerce."
After 83 years of interpretation, this phrase clearly means "restraint of
competition" in or affecting commerce, not restraint of commerce as
such. Hijacking an airliner certainly restrains commerce, but it is
probably not an antitrust violation.
Here, I confess that the Justice Department Memorandum attached
to Mr. Comegys' statement seems to imply a different view on the
issue.1 6 The first hypothetical case discussed involves tying of exported
15. Rahl, supra note 9, at 67-86.
16. Memorandum (case 1), supra note 3, at 55,208; see also REPORT OF ATTORNEY
19741
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components to licensing of patented or unpatented technology. The
Memorandum says that this tying would be allowable if, but for the
tying, no such goods could be sold from the United States by any
American seller, because foreign sellers have lower costs and can
undersell American firms. That is, the restraint would be allowable
apparently because it increases U.S. commerce, and by implication, it is
therefore not covered by the Act. But in my view, the restraint is
readily reached. It occurs in the course of export trade, and also it
obviously affects it. The issue should thus be, not whether the Act
covers it, but whether, being covered, it is a lawful restraint as a matter
of substantive law.
Perhaps the Justice Department means that the tying is lawful
because it is reasonable, not because the Act does not apply. The
Memorandum is not entirely clear. But this would be a strange version
of the rule of reason and an odd test for a tying arrangement. Since
tying is a per se offense domestically, and doubly so when attached to a
patent license, the Justice Department may be saying that different
substantive rules of law will apply to foreign transactions. Elsewhere,
the Memorandum states that "most restraints of trade involving foreign
commerce will be governed by the rule of reason-. ...,,7 If this means
that domestic per se rules will not be followed, and a restraint in
foreign commerce, whether domestically per se or not, will be weighed
against evidence that the restraint benefits export trade or the balance
of payments, this is not the rule of reason that I am familiar with, but is
a wholesale departure from it, and without any support in the case law,
so far as I know.'8
If you decide to rely upon these parts of the Memorandum, you will
incur certain risks. My more cautious view may sound less pleasant, but
it is safer, particularly in areas where the patent misuse doctrine might
be available, and where potential private plaintiffs and counterclaim-
ants are just around every corner.
But it may be said, if the restraint does not hurt U.S. commerce, or if
it actually helps it, why should the Act apply? Foreign trade and
foreign markets, it is argued, should be viewed differently from domes-
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRuST LAws, supra note 7, at 76;
ABA A1NTRusT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, supra note 8, at 47.
17. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 55,208.
18. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 103 n.15 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
United States v. Learner, 215 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D. Hawaii 1963).
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tic problems-in our own self-interest, and because it is not the busi-
ness of Congress to concern itself with restraints inflicted by Americans
upon foreigners abroad. One answer might be the direct one that it
would not be so strange for Congress to be concerned with what our
businesses do to foreigners. If we are concerned with warfare and
crime carried on by Americans abroad, we might reasonably be con-
cerned with the infliction of economic damage abroad by conduct
considered illegal at home.
But that answer might still miss the point. Personally, -I would stick to
what I consider to be the only reliable guide to the scope of the
Act-that is, that the Act is coicerned with restraints of competition
which occur in, or which substantially affect any of the commerce,
interstate or foreign, which Congress regulates. This is what I think the
Supreme Court decided in the Timken case,19 and it is what antitrust
policy is all about. From there on out, it is a question of the particular
substantive rules of effect on competition to be applied to determine
the ultimate legality of the conduct.
Neither the scope of antitrust nor its substantive rules can be, or
should be, manipulated to serve other Government policies on balance
of trade, balance of payments, or whatever else happens to be upsetting
Washington at any given moment.
Time does not permit discussion of the extraterritorial application
of the Clayton or Federal Trade Commission Acts in general, although
I will mention certain problems under section 7 of the Clayton Act
later.
III
EFFECT OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Time also prevents a full exploration of the impact of foreign
government activity and of international law, but I will mention certain
key points. Quite a few American businesses have come to antitrust
grief as a result of participating in foreign combinations, believing their
conduct to be lawful because the combination was lawful abroad, and in
some instances was positively encouraged by foreign law or govern-
mental action. It is quite clear that foreign government approval,
exemption or encouragement will not provide an effective American
law defense. The Swiss Watch, Continental Ore and Holophane cases all
19. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
1974]
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stand for this in one way or another.20 The Justice Department
Memorandum attached to the statement by Mr. Comegys, in Case 12,
may seem to be somewhat inconsistent with what I have said, in that it
says that "officially desired," though "not imposed," private arrange-
ments to "rationalize" competition in some foreign industries through
price and other agreements "will not in general create antitrust hazards
for American companies.12 1 The whole statement should be read very
closely, however, for the next sentence says that "In particular, .. .
restrictions in the foreign market imposed at the insistence of the
foreign government and not involving exports to the United States
should not violate U.S. antitrust laws."
If there are no exports to the United States, there may well be no
U.S. commerce involved, making the whole example pointless. If U.S.
commerce is present, the insistence of a foreign government may
amount to compulsion, not merely encouragement. Foreign govern-
ment compulsion is a good defense, as Cases 1 and' 11 of the
Memorandum indicate. 22 From American Banana to Interamerican
Refining, the courts have been saying this.23
An area of continuing uncertainty, not touched by the Memoran-
dum, is that covered domestically by the doctrine of Noerr and Penning-
ton, as limited in Trucking Unlimited.2 4 Does the Act permit efforts to
induce a foreign government to exercise its powers of compulsion? The
recent opinion of the district court in the Occidental Petroleum case,
affirmed per curiam,2 5 states that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not
apply to persuasion of foreign governments, partly on the theory that
the doctrine rests upon a First Amendment privilege. I do not see why
our Constitution would not protect freedom to petition a foreign gov-
20. United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 5
TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70,600, at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); United States v.
Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (findings and conclusions), 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1954
Trade Cas.) 67,679 (S.D. Ohio 1954) (judgment) affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
21. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 55,212.
22. Id. at 55,208-212.
23. American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); United States v. The
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade
Cas.) 71,352 at 80,492 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., Ltd., [1954] 3 All E.R. 88, 92, (Ch.), (quoting order of American court which
excepted compliance with foreign law); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
24. Eastern Railroad Pres. Conf. v.,Noerr Motor Frgt., Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1964); California Motor Transport v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
25. 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).
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ernment against interference by our own laws. But in any case, it seems
to me unrealistic to say that compulsion by a foreign government is not
covered by the Act, while inducement of such compulsion is. Moreover,
I understand the Sherman Act to be, as explained in Parker v. Brown,2"
a regulation of privately-imposed restraints. Merely talking about a
restraint with a government is not privately imposing a restraint.
A further uncertain area is that described by my research assistant as
"market compulsion." Suppose the American firm simply cannot do
business successfully in a foreign market as a practical matter (not
because of government action) without entering into a restraint of
competition? I have often heard this abstract claim made, but have
rarely seen such facts. Assuming such a case and adequate connection
with commerce to exist, the Sherman Act will apply. Perhaps there will
be no violation, however, on the theory that market conditions, rather
than the firm's conduct, compel the restraint.27 For example, where
only a consortium of companies can accomplish a large job, the result-
ing restraints might be tolerated on a reasonableness theory. 28 This is a
borderline area of law, however.
Insofar as international law is concerned, the situation really is that
there is no general agreement among nations as to what is permissible
in the way of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. 29 The American
view is that the scope of our law as I have described it is justified by our
version of international law principles.30 To them might be added the
recent order by a District Judge in Calnetics v. Volkswagen,3 prohibiting
importation of Volkswagens with installed air conditioners, thus in
effect regulating manufacturing in West Germany. That nation under-
standably has protested, but the court also understandably was not
deterred.
IV
SPECIFIC TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS
By far the greatest number of cases have involved "international
cartel" situations, most often including some kind of division of market
26. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
27. Cf., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass.
1950).
28. Memorandum, supra note 3, at 55,211.
29. Rahl, supra note 9, ch. 7.
30. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); A.L.I.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18.
31. 353 F. Supp. 1219 (D.C. Cal. 1973).
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arrangement among horizontally-related competitors, and sometimes
also including price-fixing and other types of restraints.3 2 Many ham-
mer blows have been struck by American enforcement efforts against
the textbook types of such combinations, and few corporate counsel
need additional warnings about them today.
Nonetheless, there are some serious hazards around the perimeter of
this category which might be worth brief mention. One is the problem
presented by foreign patent pools, some of which may include restric-
tive understandings which impinge upon American commerce. Hazel-
tine Research put its patents into such pools abroad for licencing and
found itself liable to Zenith for millions of dollars in damages because
the pool refused licences to firms exporting from the United States and
not manufacturing in the foreign country.33 Westinghouse and Mit-
subishi are being sued by the Government for long-term technology
interchange arrangements alleged to result in market division. I do not
know the facts, but it appears to me possible that all or most of the
numerous interchange agreements individually might have been inno-
cent enough, but cumulatively, they seem to have impressed the Gov-
ernment as amounting to an overall market division between the
companies.3 4
Finally, on the horizontal level, one must be very careful about
cooperation agreements which gain approval under Common Market
antitrust law, or the law of some foreign nation. An arrangement may
enjoy Common Market exemption and still violate our law. There are
different situations of this kind where reliance on foreign exemption or
negative clearance, or even application for exemption or clearance, can
produce American consequences. Conversely, reliance upon an Ameri-
can exemption under Webb-Pomerene, for example, can lead to
foreign antitrust prosecution. I have been waiting for the axe to fall in
this area, as it surely must one of these days, unless the governments
themselves have a division of territory agreement.
There have been a number of alleged cases of monopolizing some
aspect of foreign commerce. The Sanib case already referred to is still
the most interesting one to me, because the conduct seems to have
occurred entirely in a foreign market. Note well that this was a private
suit, as were several of the most drastic decisions to which I have
32. Rahl, supra note 9, at 68 n.38.
33. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 n.8 (1969).
34. United States v. Westinghouse Elec., Civ. No. C70-852 SAW (N.D. Cal.) (com-
plaint) [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. § 45,070, at 52,756.
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referred, including-to repeat, Pacific Seafarers, Continental Ore, and
Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine.
In the area of mergers and joint ventures, we can see most clearly the
Government's self-imposed limitations to which I referred at the be-
ginning. To my knowledge, the Government has never attacked an
acquisition or a joint venture which did not involve alleged elimination
of, or foreclosure of actual or potential competition in the American
domestic market, as in the decided merger cases involving Schlitz3 5 and
Litton Industries,36 the settled cases of BP 37 and Ciba-Geigy,38 the pend-
ing merger case involving Gillette,39 the settled joint venture case
involving Monsanto,40 and the recently dissolved joint venture between
Hercules and Mitsui.41 The Government, I think wisely, has noted that
mergers and joint ventures abroad with foreign firms are a very
important and sometimes indispensable means of entry into foreign
markets, and it has refrained from pushing possibly applicable theories
of impact on exports or on competition in foreign markets to upset
these transactions.
A possible additional reason for this self-restraint is that section 7 of
the Clayton Act requires that the merging firms both (1) be "engaged
in commerce," which is not always true of the foreign party, and (2)
that the adverse effect on competition be found in a "section of the
country," meaning a section of the United States, rather than merely in
foreign commerce. On the latter point, the Government did attempt a
theory in the 1TT-Grinnell case which it might some day transfer to a
foreign acquisition case in order to meet the "section of the country"
problem.4 2 I would regard the theory as rather far-fetched, however.
35. United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N. D. Cal. 1966), affd
per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
36. Litton Indus., Inc., FTC Docket No. 8778, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 20,267, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,333 (1974).
37. United States v. Standard Oil, Civ. No. C69-954, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade
Cas.) 72,988 (N.D. Ohio) (consent decree).
38. United States v. CIBA Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP.
45,070, at 52,770, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 9 73,319, 73,269
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree).
39. United States v. Gillette Co., Civ. No. 68-141, [1961-1970 Transfer Binder) CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 45,068, at 52,672 (D. Mass.) (complaint).
40. United States v. Monsanto Co., 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.)
72,001 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (joint venture; consent decree); see Rahl, supra note 9, at
183.
41. United States v. Hercules, Inc., 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade Cas.)
74,530 (D.C. Del. 1973) (consent decree).
42. See United States v. ITT Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 38-39 (D. Conn. 1970), dismissed,
404 U.S. 801 (1971) (The Government contended that the acquisition of Grinnell would
produce profits abroad which could be used to lessen competition domestically. The case
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ITT seems to be everywhere, including on the plaintiff's side. Its
claim against General Telephone, in which the court accepted
jurisdiction,43 dares to tread where the Government so far has not. It
alleges that General's acquisition of a Canadian company cut off ITT's
export opportunities to that market, a theory of attack on a nierger
which the Government has not used. The spectacle of ITT outdoing
the Government in antitrust enforcement theories is something to
conjure with, even in the present-day mind-boggling world.
There has been very little Government activity against the foreign
distribution arrangements of American companies. Case 5 of the Jus-
tice Department Memorandum, however, indicates that the Govern-
ment will apply the doctrines of the Schwinn case where a vertical
territorial allocation abroad restricts reselling to the United States.44
Here, the Antitrust Division's principle of protecting competition in
our domestic market would be invoked. On the other hand, the
statement does not mention distribution restraints which occur in
American export commerce, and have their ultimate impact in foreign
markets, such as exclusive selling agreements with foreign buyers, and
resale price restraints. I would consider neither to be ipso facto safe,
however. The law may reach both, and they should be analyzed to
determine their doctrinal and competitive status.
Once again, the private suit underscores the importance of a broader
view of the scope of the law. In Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v.
Sunkist Growers, Inc.,45 the court holds illegal Sunkist's exclusive selling
agreement with a distributor in Hong Kong because it led to refusal by
Sunkist to sell to other American firms who sought to buy from it for
export to Hong Kong. This restraint barred U.S. exports sufficiently
that the Government itself might have attacked it. It could be the
beginning stage in further antitrust litigation generally as to foreign
exclusive buying and selling arrangements affecting U.S. exports.
I have already commented upon certain problems of licensing of
patents and technology, and will add just a little more. The Justice
Department Memorandum is extremely important on these questions.
It has put to rest for the time being fears that the Government might
was not sustained on the facts, but the theory might conceivably be used to attack a
foreign acquisition).
43. ITT Corp. v. GT & E Corp., 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1972 Trade Cas.) 1 74,094
(D. Hawaii 1972).
44. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
45. Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 5 CCH TRADE
REG. REP. (1973-1 Trade Cas.) 74,523 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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be getting ready to attack as divisions of territory mere licensing of
counterpart patents in different countries to different licensees.4 6 It
has gone a good deal further than that, in what I find to be the most
important of the statements in this area, i.e., it indicates that under
some circumstances even express restrictions against exports by foreign
licensees to the United States will be allowed, not only as to patents but
as to unpatented know-how and technology. 47 The 6th Circuit in the
Dunlop case has just added the surprising fillip that the Patent Code
itself is authority that express patent license restrictions against export
to the United States are allowable.48 That decision does not reach the
know-how question, however.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I should say, by way of conclusion, that a Justice Department which
gives partial blessing to express prohibitions of exports to the United
States and to patent license tying is not, strictly speaking in all respects,
the Department I had come to know. We have known all along,
however, of its self-restraint in the foreign commerce area generally.
We should probably be thankful for its insistence that genuine and
important American interests be present before it attacks, though we
may disagree on what those interests are. We should also applaud its
efforts to clarify the law. If some of them leave room for disputation, as
an academic, I of course am grateful for that too. And if some of them
seem to hold out sanctuaries which may be blasted to bits by private
plaintiffs at any time, none of us should be too surprised. This is one
reason we need corporate counsel, and antitrust counsel as well.
46. Memorandum (case 3), supra note 3, at 55,209-210.
47. Id. (case 2), at 55,209.
48. Dunlop Co., Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1973-2 Trade
Cas.) 74,671 (6th Cir. 1973) (the court held that territorial restrictions in foreign patent
licenses were lawful even though they prohibited exports to the U.S.).
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